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Abstract:  
Mutual and Employee-owned businesses (MEOBs) continue to experience a revival in the UK, be it 
through the growth of building societies and financial mutuals, or the success of employee-owned 
businesses (see Co-operatives UK 2013a; EOA 2013). In addition, government has promoted MEOBs 
by transferring public services into new corporate forms, citing reports of resilience and long-term 
success of MEOBs. 
Yet despite these developments, there appears to be some ambiguity as to how to evaluate the 
performance of MEOBs. The lack of a coherent framework that takes the values, principles and 
structures into account when assessing outputs and outcomes results in a narrow understanding of 
MEOB performance, often focused on quantitative measures irrespective of the values and 
principles held by these types of organisations, and indeed their purpose. 
In an effort to advance such work, this paper seeks to outline a framework to evaluate mutual and 
employee-owned businesses taking account of a variety of dimensions that affect how MEOBs do 
business, and the outcomes they produce, to broaden the idea of performance by joining up values 
and principles that are at the centre of the mutual model with the outputs and outcomes that are 
being created.   
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Introduction 
Across the political spectrum and society in the UK there is a growing interest in mutuals and 
employee-owned businesses (or MEOBs)1. Civil society, particularly in responding to the 2008 
financial crisis and the subsequent economic recession that eroded trust in mainstream business, 
has been vocal in seeking greater diversity in the economy (Co-operatives UK 2013b; Leadbeater & 
Christie 1999; Julian 2013; Mutuo 2013). Banks specifically have been at the heart of this discussion 
(Butzbach 2014; ECCR 2011; NEF 2013) – see, for example, campaigns such as ‘MoveYourMoney’2 
which encourage us to shift to alternative, often mutual or cooperatively owned, providers of 
banking services. Political interests have recognised the importance of balancing the short-term 
business interests often exhibited by shareholder owned PLCs with the need for long-term oriented 
economic activity. In addition, having a diverse set of business forms has been found to have a 
positive influence on economic stability (Haldane and May 2011; Goodhart and Wagner 2012; 
Llewellyn and Michie 2010) and sustainable economic growth (Co-operatives UK 2014a; Sadler & 
Goyder 2013). The force of these arguments is reflected in a range of measures to grow alternative 
business forms that were included in the previous government’s Coalition Paper (HM Government 
2010: 29).  
The focus on MEOBs in this paper reflects these ambitions to strengthen alternative forms of 
business which, at least to the non-expert, appear to have certain commonalities. From the 
government’s perspective, it makes sense to group these types of alternative business together for 
practical purposes and to communicate alternative approaches to business (see for example LGG 
2011). Indeed definitions of cooperatives, mutuals and employee-owned business overlap in some 
areas: a) mutuals and cooperatives can be employee-owned and b) if the words ‘members’ are 
replaced with ‘employee’, definitions of mutuality would be akin to the discussions of employee-
ownership provided by the EOA (2013).  In addition, the established cooperative principles (ICA 2014) 
are relevant in other MEOBs, including employee-owned businesses, social enterprises and other 
forms of collective ownership models: Voluntary and Open Membership, Democratic Member 
control, Member Economic Participation, Autonomy and Independence, Education, Training and 
Information, Co-operation among Co-operatives, and Concern for Community. Hence it is not 
surprising to see that key publications of the sector often make reference to cooperatives, mutual 
and employee-owned businesses in the same publication, for example the Co-operatives UK (2014a) 
includes John Lewis Partnership in The UK co-operative 100 list.  
At first glance, this renewed interest in cooperatives (COs), mutual businesses (MBs) and employee-
ownership (EO) has had positive results: MBs and COs had a combined turnover of £115bn in 2013, 
up 26% compared to 2008 (£84bn) and employ almost one million people (Mutuo 2013); the 
number of COs has grown from 4,820 in 2008 to 6,323 in 2013 (Co-operatives UK 2013a; 2014a); and 
EO companies now account for 3% of GDP in the UK, with ambitions to grow its share of the market 
to 10% by 2020 (EOA 2013). This demand for new types of economic actors is further underlined by 
the rise of social entrepreneurship across the UK, especially in the most deprived communities that 
are underserved by mainstream businesses (Social Enterprise UK 2013). 
                                                          
1 Following Johnston Birchall (2010, p.4), in this paper ‘mutual’ refers to a member-owned enterprise in which 
ownership and control resides in members of two (or more) key stakeholder groups, namely workers and 
consumers/service users, and whose benefits go largely to these members. 
2 For additional information see: http://moveyourmoney.org.uk/ 
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However, there is also some evidence that not all is well, despite these positive developments for 
MEOBs. In particular, the declining diversity in the financial services sector explored by Michie and 
Oughton (2013, 2014) and Tischer (2013, 70) highlights the difficulties in creating and sustaining 
firms that are different to the mainstream. Building societies have continued a trend for 
consolidation by declining in number by 25% since the financial crisis of 2008, despite being 
regarded as ‘winners’ by the press and themselves. At the same time, the crisis in the Co-op 
Group has thrown open the question of what the underlying values and objectives of co-operative 
enterprise are or ought to be (The Guardian 2014; see also Hunt 2014; and Bastani, Benjamin and 
Coppola 2014). What constitutes good or bad performance for an enterprise that is a mutual or 
employee-owned and what is the underlying bottom line?  
This lack of understanding of MEOB economic activity is particularly visible when it comes to 
evaluating the performance of MEOBs at the firm level. The rise of the PLC as the supposed gold-
standard of corporate forms has changed the performance criteria that are used to appraise 
corporate performance overall largely to exclude those that are not easily quantifiable in pounds, 
dollars or yen. Financial figures and ratios, be it Return on Equity (RoE), Net Profit, Leverage and Tier 
1 Capital ratios, are used within the firm and by external agents, including consultants, regulators 
and accountants to quantify company ‘success’. Froud et al. (2006, 65-99) argue that this process of 
financialisation has changed the way in which firms strategically engage with their performance 
goals, encouraging a focus on the promotion of financial figures and associated narratives that are 
demanded by capital markets. The dominance of financial measures of performance and their usage 
in the specific context of evaluating corporate success in the preceding year is, alongside their 
apparent simplicity, further driven by regulatory demands for annual accounts (Companies House 
2014) and professional standards emerging from accountancy practices.  
However, financial measures lack the power fully to capture the performance of MEOBs because, 
unlike PLCs, MEOBs’ bottom line is more diverse and their stakeholder management is more 
complex. Indeed, to speak of one bottom line in the context of MEOBs is confusing because more 
often than not they have multiple goals and employ a diversity of quantitative and qualitative 
measurements, some of which cannot, perhaps should not, be quantified. This is not to say that 
MEOBs are beyond evaluation; instead, other, more qualitative, measures can be used to illustrate 
the wider positive impact generated by MEOB business, for example through story telling in a case 
study format, especially where outcomes are content specific. 
Likewise, existing performance evaluation tools for MEOBs are overwhelmingly concerned with 
quantifying impact, even when it is not financial in nature. For example the Co-operatives UK’s 
(2013a) The Co-operative Economy 2013 employs a multitude of numbers to describe the 
cooperative sector as a whole, highlighting diverse financial (turnover, growth, performance, etc.) 
and non-financial factors (membership, trust, workplace diversity, etc.). The Co-operative Group’s 
(2014) Sustainability Report 2013 also quantifies its impact on environment and society in aptly 
titled sections. Yet the ability of these to make meaningful statements about performance other 
than financial is limited because of the disconnect between what the organisation aims to achieve 
and the way in which one attempts to measure performance. Indeed, one might argue that the 
problems faced by the Co-operative Group are illustrative of this new financialised reality, because 
Co-op management focused on achieving performance targets similar to those of competitors – 
growth and financial returns – irrespective of the needs and wants of its key stakeholders. 
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Others, including Mutuo (2013) and Ecology Building Society (EBS 2014), present additional 
narratives in the form of case studies and story-telling; however, here any discussion of performance 
is context specific and, in an ideal case, should be selective to include those cases that best 
represent what happens at the organisational level more generally. Yet in reality, these are likely to 
feature more unique stories that discuss outcomes that are considered superior and particularly 
powerful, but that may not necessarily reflect outcomes achieved in more standard cases.  
The aim of the current paper is the development of an extended evaluative framework for MEOB 
performance. Existing approaches that focus on outputs (financial, cultural and social metrics) are 
expanded by adding dimensions specifically relevant to making sense of performance in mutual and 
employee-owned businesses. These include values and normative principles that provide guidance in 
defining and communicating alternative organisational goals. The nature of the mutual/employee-
owned organisation expressed through employee and member participation, culture and leadership 
must be considered when examining MEOBs because of the implications that employee and/or 
member participation can have on strategy. Thus, the value that is being created by MEOBs can best 
be measured via a number of quantitative and qualitative indicators including financial, social and 
cultural metrics, legitimacy and wider outcomes. 
Section 2 thus contrasts ‘shareholder value’ and ‘stakeholder value’ principles to draw out the 
limitations of both concepts and to position the evaluative framework. Section 3 reviews and 
summarises existing concepts and approaches to evaluating the performance of MEOBs. These 
include background literatures on the impact of ownership and leadership styles, as well as 
employment conditions within MEOBs, before outlining concepts used to discuss financial outputs 
and social impact measures, such as social value. Section 4 outlines the structure, logic and different 
dimensions of the proposed evaluative framework, and indicates the linkages between the selected 
indicators. The final section discusses the implications of this new framework, and outlines a 
research agenda based upon it. 
Shareholder value vis-à-vis stakeholder value  
To answer the question of why the development of a new evaluative framework for MEOBs is 
important, one must understand the current orthodoxy, given that doctrine of shareholder value 
(SHV) has been the dominant strategic influence on business practices over the past 30 years. 
Ever since Friedman proclaimed that the “one and only one social responsibility of business [is] to 
use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits” (Friedman 2007 [1970], 
178), the literature on SHV has been widely discussed in the context of corporate governance, 
performance evaluation, and the influence of these on managers (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; 
Bratton 2002), on operations and human resources (Becker et al 1997; Christopher and Ryals 1990), 
and on mergers and acquisitions (Datta and Puia 1995). Furthermore, concepts such as principal-
agent theory emerged to align business behaviour with the interests of its owners through the 
maximisation of profits, dividends and share prices, which are measured through ratios and metrics 
including, amongst others, Shareholder Value Added (SVA), Return on Equity (RoE) and Cash Flow 
Return on Investment (CFROI) (Froud et al 2000). Importantly, the widespread adoption of SHV by 
management was not, as often proclaimed, a legal necessity or managerial obligation; it was 
promoted by managers and capital market actors, such as hedge funds and pension funds (Stout, 
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2012) who are the key beneficiaries of net income being returned to shareholders via dividends and 
share buy-backs (Weston and Siu 2002, 43). Thus, SHV, whilst dominant since at least the 2000s 
(Kraakman and Hansmann 2001), is not the only mechanism by which to measure business 
performance. 
Nevertheless, the shareholder value narrative is a powerful one: the owners of the business must be 
rewarded with the maximum return on their investment, and therefore both business structure and 
strategic planning should be shaped by senior management who are in turn incentivised primarily to 
meet investor needs. See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Stylised Overview of Shareholder Value Components in Framework Format 
 Normative Principles Organisation Outputs Legitimacy Outcomes
Maximisation of 
profits
Rationalisation / 
Downsizing
Maximisation of 
firm value
Shareholder 
dominance
Financial 
metrics
Regulatory (push 
for deregulation)
Shareholder 
value
Short-term 
objectives
top-down 
culture
CR/CSR 
Reports
to shareholders 
only
Distribution of 
profits to 
shareholders 
(and sen execs)
Strong 
leaders 
CEO/CFO
Commoditisation 
of Labour
Principle-
Agent 
induced 
governance
 
However, the 2008 financial crisis resulted in calls for alternative forms of business to flourish 
alongside, if not replace, models that are driven by the SHV principle. But of course, the task of 
replacing or challenging the SHV doctrine is a difficult one, not least because of the multiple 
combinations of principles, organisational types, outputs, legitimacy and outcomes that might be 
used as alternatives. The stakeholder theory of the firm (Brenner 1992; Carroll 1979; Freeman 1984), 
the most prominent conceptualisation of an alternative business logic, only partially fulfils the role of 
providing a different logic. Its key premise is that businesses should refer to the needs and demands 
of a number of stakeholders when making operational and strategic decisions. It distinguishes 
between a broad and narrow stakeholder view, thus providing some guidance for which 
stakeholders to include in what decision for different types of businesses. The narrow definition 
(Mitchell et al 1997) focusses only on those considered to “bear some form of risk as a result of 
having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in the firm” (Clarkson 
1994 in Mitchell et al. 1997, 861), i.e. shareholders, employees, suppliers and customers. The 
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inclusion of these stakeholders and the continuous engagement with them in terms of operational 
or strategic matters seems a daunting task for management. Preble (2005) illustrates the 
complexities that arise when adopting a stakeholder management model with promoting some sort 
of prioritizing mechanism. 
Indeed, whilst theoretically a constructive input, there has been little advance in operationalising the 
concept to provide a simple but convincing guide for management to engage other stakeholders in 
firm settings. One key reason is that none of the proposed solutions has managed to gain general 
acceptance in the way SHV theory did, mainly because the means by which MEOBs operate are 
diverse and linked to a specific set of principles that inform the structure, outcomes, legitimacy and 
output variables. Added to this is the lack of alternative measures of stakeholder value. Although 
Elkington’s (1998) triple bottom line and Jensen’s (2000) Enlightened Value Maximisation are 
attempts to provide some theoretical input, there is no agreed upon set of measures that illustrate 
stakeholder value in a way that is comparable to SHV. More recently, Porter and Kramer (2011) 
sought to address this issue through the “shared value” concept, linking business strategy and 
competitive advantage with the need to be economically and socially sustainable. Their idea, whilst 
taking into account stakeholder needs beyond the needs of shareholders, can also be seen as a 
strategic response to challenges to capitalism that would enable firms to avoid having to make 
substantial changes to how they operate their business, by enabling them to be seen to “reshape 
capitalism and its relationship to society” (2011, 3). Emerson’s (2003) concept of Blended Value 
offers a more holistic approach to the conceptualisation of value creation to refocus attention, away 
from financial value creation which has been a dominant goal for business under shareholder value, 
towards jointly accounting for financial, social and/or environmental value. His idea is that joint 
creation and recognition of these types of value is not mutual exclusive but can enhance overall 
performance. Nicholls (2009) usefully highlights the different approaches employed to account for 
social and financial value. Whilst Emerson (2003) and Nicholls (2009) appropriately note that 
organisations create financial and social returns that can be accounted for, the concept as it stands 
focuses on the impact or the outputs created, largely ignoring the relevance of inputs for guiding 
organisational decision making processes in order to  produce outcomes. Hence, when evaluating 
MEOB performance, it is not only the outputs generated by a firm that must be considered in value 
creation, but also the role of values and principles. 
Hence, this paper seeks to develop a framework that allows for the evaluation of MEOBs with 
respect to the purpose of those firms which are currently too often ignored, and that is flexible 
enough to account for the different ideas about and extents to which employee and other co-
owners are involved in shaping MEOBs. Doing so is important, because it makes little sense to apply 
standard efficiency and profitability measures to a firm that seeks to operate on a not-for-profit 
basis or whose prime objective is to offer secure employment conditions over the long-term. The 
framework pursues the goal of understanding outcomes and outputs in relation to the principles and 
aims that guide an organisation and that are, therefore, reflected in its structure and logics. This 
approach will enable a clearer picture to be developed of the type of performance measurement 
and indicators that are most appropriate to a specific firm, type of firm, or sector. 
In this light, the framework proposed in this paper (Figure 2) examines a series of dimensions to 
contextualise performance with reference to the values as an input, and the value created as an 
outcome measure. These include normative principles, the organisational structure, outputs and 
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outcomes (including an assessment of legitimacy to key stakeholders). Instead of proposing 
something entirely new, the ambition is to synthesise existing research within a framework which 
sets out the linkages between them. The following section thus outlines the key academic and non-
academic approaches to evaluating performance in MEOBs. 
 
Figure 2: An Evaluative Framework for Mutual and Employee-owned Businesses 
Values    Normative Principles    Mutual Organisation   Outputs        Legitimacy Spectrum                          Outcomes                      VALUE 
 
 
V 
A 
L 
U 
E 
S 
Securing voice 
& democratic 
accountability 
Support self -
respect/mutual 
respect 
Opportunity for 
meaningful 
work 
Fair 
distribution of 
rewards 
Support wider 
citizenship 
VALUES             PRINCIPLES                 ACTIONS/SYSTEMS /STRUCTURES               OUPUTS                                      OUTCOMES               VALUE  
SOCIAL & 
FINANCIAL
PURPOSES 
Governance 
Voice 
System 
Values & 
Culture 
Member 
Community 
Leadership 
REGULATORY 
ASSOCIATIONAL 
PRAGMATIC 
NORMATIVE 
COGNITIVE 
Customer /User 
Experience of 
Fulfilled Needs 
Member Trust 
Employee 
Fairness  
Community 
Legitimacy 
Organisational 
resilience 
FINANCIAL METRICS 
CULTURE METRICS 
Internal & external 
SOCIAL METRICS 
Stakeholder 
VALUE 
contribution 
to 
capabilities 
for living 
Satisficing level of 
financial 
performance 
Meeting and 
developing 
needs 
 
Developments in Evaluating Mutual and Employee-owned Businesses  
Over the past decade, increasing attention has been paid to measuring performance in mutual and 
employee-owned businesses, centred on the various relationships between organizational structure 
(mutual and employee-owned), practices (member/employee participation) and outcomes 
(profitability, job satisfaction and mutual benefits) discussed below. Yet, it is particularly in the post-
2008 crisis period that these ideas have been used to generate analytical frameworks aimed at 
including less obvious principles and processes that incorporate mutual values. Essentially, the aim is 
to link structure, processes, cultures and outcomes in a framework that facilitates the assessment of 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of mutual performance together. Measuring mutual 
performance requires the ability to measure each of the component indicators that performance.  
To accomplish this, the proposed evaluative framework incorporates and builds on previous 
research into measuring mutuality by Davies and Michie (2013) and the mutual scorecard developed 
by the Police Mutual (2014); along with the work on performance in employee owned business by 
Michie et al (2002), Matrix Evidence (2010), and the Nuttall review of Employee Ownership (2012). 
Interviews have been conducted with senior managers and executives from 15 MEOBs reflecting 
different forms of ownership and sectors, including cooperatively and employee-owned 
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retailers/wholesalers, as well as financial, community and healthcare mutuals, to discuss and review 
the content and logic that informs the framework. Interviews were semi-structured and open-ended 
to first explore how respondent organisations currently approached performance evaluation and to 
then critically reflect upon the features, structures and flow of the proposed framework.  
Beyond this, the framework seeks to draw attention to the interactions and interdependencies 
amongst the various factors, with for example the principles and cultural values influencing 
operations and decision-making, and ultimately outcomes and value creation.  
Ownership, productivity and performance in mutual and employee-owned firms 
The relationship between ownership, productivity and performance has been extensively studied for 
employee-owned business, particularly in the US where over 10% of the workforce participates in 
employee-ownership (Kruse 2002). As summarised by Matrix Evidence (2010, 6) and in the Nuttal 
Review (2012, 22-26), this research has shown that employee-owned firm financial performance 
(measured through profitability) is at least as good as for other businesses; productivity gains exists, 
especially where employees participate in management and decision-making (see Kramer 2010; 
Michie et al 2002); and such firms tend to be stable in times of economic adversity, and are often 
innovative. 
There has been less research into the effects on performance and productivity of mutual ownership 
other than employee-ownership. In part this is because mutuality differs substantially across MEOB 
organisations in terms of the member-base. Moreover, because mutuals are not necessarily 
subjected to economic outcome performance measures, often where social or community outcomes 
are dominant (housing mutuals, healthcare mutuals etc.), tracking and comparing profitability and 
productivity indicators may not be particularly meaningful. That said, mutuals and cooperatives must 
perform and be (financially) sustainable. Furthermore, the importance of economic performance 
indicators differs across sectors: financial services mutuals for example must pay attention to their 
economic performance because they need to earn sufficient profit to finance capital requirements 
and growth, and to absorb market risks (as illustrated by KPMG’s annual publication of key statistical 
data on building societies, KPMG 2013). 
Mutuals thus tend to rely on a range of key performance indicators through scorecards (Kaplan and 
Norton 1992), triple bottom line accounting, or the use of other measures such as Cost-benefit 
Analysis (CBA), Basic Efficiency Resource (BER), or Social Return on Investment (SRoI) (Davies and 
Michie 2013, 11). SRoI places “a financial value on an organisation’s wider impact” making it 
attractive since financial outputs are more easily comparable then more traditional social accounting 
approaches (The SROI Network 2012); thus SRoI is “an analytic tool for measuring and accounting for 
a much broader concept of value … how value is created or destroyed. For example, Nef research on 
the value created by a training programme for ex-offenders revealed that for every £1 invested, 
£10.50 of social value was created” (Wood and Leighton 2010, 19). 
Participation, work and leadership cultures, and performance in MEOBs 
Despite the need to account for financial performance in mutual and employee-owned companies, 
research has also gone into non-financial performance indicators. These include measurements of 
stakeholder value (members, employees, communities etc) and mutual culture (attitudes, 
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behaviours and norms), Davies and Michie (2013, 3); and the overall impact of employee-ownership 
on employees themselves (Matrix Evidence 2010, 6). This research indicates a mostly positive impact 
from both customer and employee participation on employee commitment, job satisfaction, and 
ultimately financial performance (Michie et al 2002, Figure 3). Moreover, there is evidence that firm 
performance is positively affected when employee participation in firm strategic and day-to-day 
decision-making is meaningful; that is to say, when work has objective value and this corresponds to 
the worker’s own subjective goals and ambitions (Yeoman 2013). These ideas have been widely 
adopted by MEOBs, with non-financial performance indicators featuring in annual reports as part of 
mutual scorecards (see Police Mutual), performance wheels (see Mid-counties Coop), or partnership 
reports (see John Lewis).  
Figure 3: Linkages from Share Ownership to Organisational Effects, Impact on Employees, and 
Organisational Outcomes 
1. Share 
Ownership
2. Effect 3. Impact
Employee 
whare 
ownership
Financial 
incentives
4. Outcomes
Motivation 
and 
commitment
Increase 
productivity 
and 
profitability
Reduced 
labour 
turnover
 
Source: Michie et al (2002, 6) 
 
Also, the cooperative movement itself is a source of information as to the values and principles that 
are relevant to mutual and employee-owned businesses other than cooperatives, as they have 
common interests in securing the “economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations” of members 
and employee-owners (ICA 2014). Thus Communities and Local Government Committee (2012) 
suggests that “mutuals and co-operatives are both owned by a defined group of members such as 
employees, service users, customers or others with an interest in the business. They have a 
governance structure which gives members a say in how the organisation is run and they are often 
run for the benefit of its members with profits retained within the business or distributed to its 
members”.  
 
Framework Components  
Before describing the components of the framework (Figure 2), it is useful to introduce the structure 
and logic of the framework to set out the connections between components and how the framework 
may be used by practitioners and academics alike. This is important because the framework needs to 
be understood as a response to the prioritising of financial reporting in judging business 
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performance, as arguably happened in the case of the Co-operative Bank, leading not only to its own 
financial performance and governance system being questioned, but that of the Co-operative Group 
as a whole. In turn, the Myners Review (2014a) was questioned in relation to the traditional 
principles and organisation of a cooperative, not least his proposals to remove elected members, a 
central feature of cooperatives, from the group board (Barber et al 2014). By offering a framework 
that addresses these issues in a unitary way, with the organisation as a whole at the centre of 
analysis, the paper seeks to refocus attention on the distinct features that make MEOBs alternatives 
to mainstream businesses.  
Structure and logic 
The framework presented in Figure 2 features a series of dimensions that are organised along a 
‘values-to-value’ grid to introduce a step-wise and reflective approach of evaluating MEOBs. The 
structure of the framework follows a logic by which MEOB evaluation is not overly focused on its 
component parts, but rather offers a holistic picture of a MEOB organisation as one entity that is 
influenced by values and principles, which guide the MEOB’s organisation and governance, to 
produce a set of outcomes which enhance the (financial and social) well-being of stakeholders.  
The intention is to guide users through the evaluative process, ensuring that values and principles 
are considered at the core of the organisation, with structures and governance reflecting these 
mutual ideas. The framework further suggests that outcomes, outputs, legitimacy and value creation 
should be understood as inherently linked to the values and principles, and to the mutual nature of 
the organisation itself; hence they should be understood within their specific organisational context. 
In so doing, the framework seeks to encourage the user to be reflective when evaluating MEOB 
performance, in particular by considering outputs alongside the principles and the structure of the 
organisation (as discussed in the next section). Thus, the arrows at the bottom of the framework 
express a logical flow when evaluating MEOBs not dissimilar to an instruction manual; however, this 
is not to say that the framework may not be used in the opposite direction – for example in 
situations when a problem has been identified with respect to outcomes or legitimacy, and the 
evaluation seeks to trace back to the root(s) of this problem.  
Connections between components  
It is important to appreciate that the components should not be considered in isolation, but rather 
that it is the sum of components and their relationships that inform the investigation and any 
evaluation. These connections may be more or less obvious. For example, employee fairness should 
clearly be understood as an outcome of the degree to which democratic principles, opportunities for 
meaningful work, rewards, and voice systems are established and operated by the organisation. 
Perhaps less obviously, community legitimacy should respond to the principles set out through the 
support of wider citizenship and community engagement via the member community by, for 
example, supporting local charitable causes and local businesses.  
The framework also encourages reflecting on components that have been evaluated previously, or 
to trace-back aspects of performance, for example financial results, and how they are being 
influenced by the set-up of the mutual organisation and the values and principles it adheres to. For 
example, any consideration of value created in the context of the contributions made to the 
capabilities of customer, employee or other member owners requires an understanding of the 
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mechanisms by which this is achieved, be it for example through participation, long-term 
employment opportunities, or organisational resilience. 
Clearly, not all components are equally relevant for all types of MEOBs. For example, a consumer 
cooperative may not actively focus on employee fairness. However, even if components do not 
appear to be directly relevant to an organisation, their being included may encourage framework 
users to think in different ways about the organisation in question. Thus even if employees are not 
members, management might indeed find it valuable to ensure that employee needs are met as 
doing so may benefit customers through improved service, as well as economically, through reduced 
absence from work. 
Values and Principles 
Because the value proposition in MEOBs is more diverse than for shareholder-owned PLCs, it is 
important to identify the values and principles that underpin the mutual organisation and that, 
therefore, influence both the structure and value created.  Values are fundamental beliefs that guide 
action. In an organisational setting, Enz defines values as ”the beliefs held by an individual or group 
regarding means and ends organizations ‘ought to’ or ‘should’ identify in the running of the 
enterprise” (1988, 287). For Rokeach (1973), a value is ‘an enduring belief that a specific mode of 
conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse 
mode of conduct or end-state of existence.’ They are the ‘building blocks’ of human behaviour and 
the bases of collective action (Stackman et al. 2000). Values shape actors’ preferences for one 
behaviour rather than another (Rokeach 1968), and provide an interpretive framework for meaning-
making (Pettigrew 1987). Hence, a values system which is judged by members to be legitimate  
grounds for a philosophy of organising and the system of management practices that deliver the 
purposes for which the organisation exists (Monks et al 2013).  
Values may be drawn from a variety of sources whether personal, organisational or 
normative/societal. The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) values have been drawn upon by 
new public service mutuals, in combination with the diversity of social values aimed at the public 
interest (Bozeman 2007). For example, Rochdale Boroughwide Housing, a dual constituency mutual 
providing affordable housing used the ICA and their public service values to identify the following 
mutual values of: responsibility, equity, democracy, pioneering, openness, honesty, caring and 
championing (Yeoman 2015). Principles are rules or norms for decision-making, and are derived from 
fundamental beliefs about how persons and organisations ought to behave and to act.  
The following non-hierarchically ordered list of principles has been derived from both Yeoman’s 
mutual values (2015) and the ICA’s (2014) description of values and principles to provide the 
framework user with a set of components they may be able to identify as being relevant to the 
MEOB being analysed. As aforementioned, not all categories may be applicable, and in certain 
contexts there may be additional aspects to be considered, set out by the individual organisation 
itself, or by legislation or regulation. 
Financial satisficing, refers to a decision-making process of finding a level of financial performance 
that is deemed acceptable by the organisation. While it is generally not the aim of a MEOB to 
maximise profit as a shareholder-owned firm would seek to do, performance cannot be detached 
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from how the enterprise is doing financially. The enterprise must at least be solvent financially and 
should ordinarily aim to make a reasonable trading surplus. 
General good practice. Beyond the ‘bottom line’ there are certain values which one would expect 
any economic enterprise, including a MEOB, to affirm. These include, for example, equality of 
opportunity, due process and recognition of trade unions. 
Democracy and accountability. A key aim of a MEOB is that it should offer customer, employee or 
other member-owners to participate with the opportunity to engage in democratic decision-making. 
Key decisions and decision-makers must be accountable, in direct and clear ways, to the workforce. 
Fair distribution. A key aim of a MEOB should be to achieve a distribution of reward within the 
enterprise that is fair. This does not rule out differences in rewards, but fairness does require that 
there be limits on the ratio of top pay to that of the lowest paid workers. Such ratios should be 
determined through the democratic procedures internal to the enterprise. 
Meaningful work. Meaningful work is work that tracks an objective good, for example job 
satisfaction, and which is also seen as valuable by the worker themselves. Such work unites an 
object or purpose of independent value to the affective engagement of the worker (Yeoman 2014a; 
2014b). MEOBs function well when decision-making structures offer workers the opportunity to 
construct their work so that it has meaning. (Again, the democratic structures of the enterprise are 
relevant here.)  
Mutual respect and recognition of needs. All MEOB enterprises typically affirm the worth of workers 
and foster relations of mutual respect. But MEOBs should be particularly sensitive to the whole 
person and discourage a view of others that reduces them to their instrumental utility to a 
productive enterprise. (This might be evident, for example, in the way a co-op or mutual approaches 
a health issue that a worker has). Related to this, MEOBs should recognise and affirm the needs of 
producers, consumers and service users. The cooperative ethos is grounded in an acceptance of 
needs as part of common humanity. 
Contribution to a wider social good. MEOBs frequently see it as part of their mission to pursue their 
values in the wider social world, not just within the operation of the enterprise itself. So another 
aspect of good performance concerns how effectively the mutual or employee-owned enterprise 
advances its values in the wider social world. A related concern is with the ethical integrity of the 
enterprise: that it is able to function in the world in a way that is consistent with its values and does 
not feel pressured to compromise them in its business operations. 
Design Elements of Mutual Organisations 
In order to ensure that these values and principles are enacted within the MEOB organisation, the 
organisational architecture, particularly in the areas of governance, leadership and participation, 
must be shaped accordingly. Because MEOBs aim to achieve somewhat different goals reflecting the 
range of services they offer to a number of stakeholders, the specific organisational architecture 
may be different across MEOBs; however, the absence of these principles from the organisational 
architecture should raise concerns about such a MEOB. For example, as most MEOBs subscribe to 
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the idea that customer, employee or other member-owners are being given a democratic voice, the 
absence of an effective voice system, such as elections or other forms of participation in decision-
making, would flag potential shortcomings that may have repercussions for the overall performance 
of such an organisation. An ideal form of mutual organisation will be characterised by an integrated 
system of management practices, such as: the precondition of status equality, given by being a co-
owner; the open availability to all of relevant knowledge and information; deliberation using reasons 
that everyone can understand; and a voting procedure which is perceived to be fair and inclusive 
(Kaarsemaker & Poutsma 2006). The key design features for the creation of management practices 
are: purpose, governance, culture/values, voice system, work design, leadership and member 
community (Figure 4).  
Figure 4: Design Elements for Mutual Organisation 
 
Source: Yeoman 2015 
 
A well-run MEOB would feature an organisational architecture that institutes the following features: 
Social and financial purposes. As in other firms, the objectives of a MEOB organisation should be 
clearly communicated. Whilst some MEOBs seek to be financially viable and focus attention on social 
outcomes, others may clearly articulate financial performance goals, in terms of growth, profit or 
Return on Capital Employed. Either way, the intentions are often disclosed in mission statements and 
communicated through annual reports to member-owners.  
Governance. The governance structure of a MEOB should respond to values and principles, for 
example, democratic participation and mutual support. The governance system may be 
characterised by reconfigured relationships between internal and external stakeholders, democratic 
conversations, improved information flows, adaptive and innovative capabilities, high levels of trust, 
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accountability and legitimacy, and being outcome (rather than output) focused (Yeoman 2013, 1). 
Some MEOBs may have additional boards to represent member interests, overseeing executive 
(strategic) management decisions. Voting rights awarded to members ensure that representatives 
and board members suitably reflect the member interests. However, board composition is also 
affected by regulatory requirements, particularly in financial mutuals. 
Voice System. The ability of members and employees to voice their needs and wants is an essential 
characteristic of democratically run MEOBs. The voice system consists of at least two aspects: 1) the 
level of voice given to members – i.e. how much control can they exercise directly or indirectly; 2) 
the mechanism by which voice is secured – i.e. through representation at board level or direct voting 
on issues brought forward. Hirschman (1970) describes voice as ‘any attempt at all to change rather 
than to escape from an objectionable state of affairs’. In more conventional terms, Lavelle et al. 
(2010) define voice as ‘any type of mechanism, structure or practice which provides employees with 
an opportunity to express an opinion or participate in decision-making within their organisation’. 
However, it is important to note that, conceptually, voice goes beyond having a say, since having a 
say does not automatically imply influence. For example, Heller (2003) distinguishes between having 
a share in participation (as taking part in an activity) and having a share in power (as having a degree 
of influence over an activity). Wegge et al (2010) identify the importance of ‘structurally anchored 
organisational democracy’ including ‘broad-based and institutionalised employee influence 
processes that are not ad hoc or occasional in nature’ (Wegge et al, 2010, 162). Establishing the basis 
for a stable system of organisational democracy implies moving away from the leader-subordinate 
dyad to ‘the constructive participation of all organisational members in the creation and 
implementation of organisational values, norms and rules’ (Verdofer et al 2012). This requires a 
voice system capable of combining democratic authorisation at the level of the organisation with 
participatory practices at the level of the task and individual (Yeoman 2014a; cf. McMahon, 1994). 
Thus, a complete voice system consistent with mutual values and principles requires both indirect 
representation and direct participatory mechanisms. This demands multiple channels for voice to be 
expressed, including direct individual participation, such as team meetings and strategy days, and 
indirect collective representation, such as employee representatives on the board and a trade union 
presence (Pyman et al 2006). 
Work culture and work design. The work environment is another important feature of MEOBs 
expressed through a working culture that should enable employees to engage in meaningful and 
self-directed work. Likewise, participation in work-related decisions and autonomy improve worker 
health, satisfaction and commitment, as well as performance. Reference to ‘co-workers’ can signal 
meaningful participation of employees in governance and decision-making, especially where there is 
an appreciative, cooperative, communicative and trusting work environment acknowledging the 
employee community as well as the individual employee. Work design plays a role in a sense of 
personal value and positive identity formation via an experience of work being meaningful and 
worthwhile. In their meta-review of the work design literature, Humphrey et al (2007) find that 
‘experienced meaningfulness is the best mediator of the relationships between motivational 
characteristics and work outcomes’ where ‘[t]hree motivational characteristics (skill variety, task 
identity, and task significance) have been hypothesized to impact work outcomes through 
experienced meaningfulness’ (Hackman and Oldham 1976, quoted in Humphrey et al 2007, 1346). 
Salzinger (1991), for example, finds that, in one cooperative of domestic services, the work was 
defined as low skilled and temporary, resulting in no training for staff; in a second cooperative, the 
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work was organised in professional teams which offered training and participation in decisions: ‘The 
result was that members of the first co-op came to regard domestic work as unimportant, whereas 
members of the second regarded it as an inherently skilled occupation, deserving of respect, fair 
treatment and decent pay’ (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999, 431). A high performance work system 
(HPWS) for a mutual organisation will include work design that is judged to be of mutual advantage. 
Organisations risk losing legitimacy when they implement HPWS in a manner which secures the 
discretionary effort of workers to the exclusive benefit of managers and shareholders. De-legitimised 
organisations no longer work in the interests of all their members, and workers may come to feel 
that their discretionary effort has been expropriated without reference to their welfare, their 
interest in fairness or their need for positive self-identity formation. Such a state of affairs damages 
the sense of fairness and trust which mediates psychological ownership, potentially undermining 
organisational resilience and long term performance (Yeoman 2013). 
Member community. The member community (single or multi-constituency) is the key distinguishing 
feature of MEOBs, following two principles that guide member engagement strategy: democratic 
control and member benefits. For membership to become meaningful, or an effective means for 
governance, a variety of aspects should be considered such as shared values, sense of community, 
mutual support, age, size and spread of the MEOB and strategy. A lack of common purpose and 
shared goals can equally cause frictions between members or employee-owners and the 
organisation. For example, public sector staff have been vocal about mutualisation of public services 
being forced upon members without prior consultation, prompting the best-practice guidance 
published by Co-operatives UK and TUC (2013), indicating how members should be engaged in 
organisational decision making. These principles, and in particular the degree to which members can 
influence business decision making are crucial factors in understanding performance of MEOBs, as 
they reflect on the embodiment of mutuality of that organisation. Differences range from 
organisations in which voting rights are transferred to the board via the introduction of proxy votes 
(Tischer 2013, 200-202), to those that have employee decision making and member voice at the core 
of how the business operates, for example at Suma Wholefoods.  
Leadership. Mutual organisations require an appropriate leadership model, combining leadership 
behaviours in keeping with mutual values and principles, and managerial competence in creating 
and sustaining the policies, practices and procedures relevant to enacting the mutual organisational 
form. This demands attention to the content, mode and basis of leadership.  With respect to the 
content of leadership, responsible or virtuous leadership provides the behaviours and orientations 
that those who lead are expected to model. Furthermore, in a mutual organisation where 
organisational practices are designed to integrate multiple stakeholders and conciliate diverse 
perspectives, leaders need to exercise wisdom and judgment (Taylor et al 2014), in additional to 
possessing the relevant skills and competences. In a fully realised mutual organisation, the mode of 
leadership is based upon distributed leadership (Fitzsimons et al, 2011) rather than the singular, 
heroic leader (Pearce and Conger 2003). The exercise of voice requires leadership capabilities to be 
widely disseminated through the organisation with the result that leaders emerge and are appointed 
not just according to formal status but also according to the needs of the situation. In their study of 
OP-Pohjola Group, a Finnish financial group containing 198 local member co-operative banks, Saila 
et al (2012) identified the following characteristics by which shared leadership could be recognised: 
recognised in the quality of interactions; evaluated by how well the problem was solved together; 
enacted in how all individuals contributed to the process of leadership; understood as a joint effort 
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of interdependent individuals, including high levels of communication; and aimed at mutual benefit 
and the common good. Finally, the basis of leadership is deliberated authority (Alvesson and Spicer 
2013), where coordinative power is legitimated through democratic representation. Extensive 
member involvement in organisational leadership, with a ‘division of leadership tasks between 
different people at several levels of the organization’, is a high performance work practice (Wegge et 
al, 2010: 154).  
 
Outputs 
 
This component of the framework refers to financial, cultural and social indicators often used in a 
standardised and quantified fashion to express performance and enable comparison with peers. 
These measures, in many respects can be located in annual reviews and CSR reports published by 
MEOBs; thus, they clearly need to feature in any evaluative framework for mutual businesses. 
Further sources of output measures are sector or industry publications on MEOBs, including the Co-
operative UK’s Co-operative Economy, the ICA’s World Co-operative Monitor and KPMG’s Building 
Societies Database. Indicators chosen by MEOBs in their own publications may differ because of 
sector-specific standards. However, this framework advocates that these indicators be understood 
within the context set out regarding the previous components.  
 
Financial metrics. Like most businesses, MEOBs report on financial performance using standard 
indicators including ROCE, turnover, profits, net debt, gearing ratio, working capital etc (Co-
operatives UK 2013c, 16). However, the important difference from shareholder-owned businesses 
lies in the use of those ratios to project future earning developments (Davies and Michie 2013, 4). 
Furthermore, for building societies, financial metrics can be found in KPMG’s annual building 
societies database (KPMG 20133) giving an in-depth account of their financial health and organised 
according to different interests with, for example, profitability only featuring in the second table. 
Cultural metrics.  Because managers and stakeholders are inescapably immersed in culture, there is 
no easily identifiable standpoint from which they can disentangle themselves from the influence of 
culture, and therefore measure its effects. However, the vital connection between values, principles, 
activities and outcomes suggests that the philosophy of mutual organisation when enacted through 
an appropriate system of management practices demands attentiveness to both a sense of fairness 
and a sense of trust. For both employees and members, fairness and trust legitimates the 
organisation’s undertakings in the use of member resources in order to pursue the organisation’s 
objects. Together, fairness and trust form the basis for a just culture which encourages people to use 
their entitlement to voice to further the interests of the organisation and its stakeholders. 
Social metrics. Since the rise of CSR and reporting standards set out by global initiatives, for example 
GRI4, social metrics are commonly used by all business, albeit at a basic level. Within the MEOB 
setting, social indicators, like those proposed by Co-operatives UK (2014b), suggest a more 
meaningful and in-depth engagement with the impact of the MEOB operation on a variety of 
                                                          
3 
http://www.kpmg.com/UK/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/PDF/Market%20Sector/Fina
ncial%20Services/building-societies-database-2013.pdf 
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internal and external stakeholders, especially employees, other members, and the communities they 
operate for and in (see Figure 5).  
Table 1: Co-operative Performance Indicators (non-financial) 
Internal External 
Member economic involvement Customer satisfaction 
Member democratic participation Investment in community and co-operative 
initiatives 
Participation of employees and members in 
training and education 
Consideration of ethical issues in 
procurement and investment decisions 
Staff injury and absentee rates Net carbon dioxide emission arising from 
operations 
 
 
Source: Co-operatives UK 2014b 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy plays a crucial role in realising the value of how MEOBs conform to stakeholder 
expectations, in particular those of member-owners (Dart 2004). In other words, organisations 
organise affairs to be seen to act in accordance with stakeholder expectations. In for-profit 
businesses, this is clearly demonstrated through the idea of maximising shareholder value in which 
management decisions are driven by the need to deliver shareholders high rates of return on their 
investments. Because stakeholders are likely to have a range of expectations, for example, a positive 
impact on stakeholder communities or democratic participation, that emerge alongside the need for 
financial viability, the ability clearly to illustrate legitimate action is vital for MEOBs to secure support 
from member-owners, as well as from society at large. In doing so, legitimacy provides a powerful 
tool to understand stakeholder perspectives and expectations – the more legitimate you want to be 
seen, the more you need to show legitimate behaviour.  
Following Suchman’s (1995) definition, organisations are legitimated if “the actions of an entity are 
proper, appropriate, or values and beliefs desirable within a socially constructed set of norms”. In 
other words, the organisation’s (perceived) actions meet the expectations set by key stakeholders, 
both in respect to norms and regulation. To understand the different types of legitimacy, it makes 
sense to follow a legitimacy typology as, for example, offered by Nicholls (2010). Following a 
typology, different types of legitimate behaviour can be addressed and put into context reflecting 
the MEOB’s interest in being seen as a legitimate actor.  
Regulatory legitimacy refers to compliance with relevant legal requirements and conventions. They 
are legally constituted and enforced by regulators within specific national boundaries, thus only 
firms that break the law are not legitimised by this type and thus regulatory legitimacy may be 
thought of as the base level. Other organisations gain legitimacy by associating with already 
established organisations, for example, governments or corporations. Others may gain associational 
legitimacy through building connections with key people, for example, the Duchy of Cornwall brand 
‘Duchy’ is associated with Prince Charles who is well known for his environmentalism. Associational 
legitimacy is generally established through some form of alliance between a set of organisations 
transferring reputation and customer trust from established actors to new entrants.  
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Within the MEOB sphere, pragmatic, normative, and cognitive legitimacy may be more suited to 
evaluating MEOB performance, because they relate to the members’ interests. The weakest level of 
legitimacy that may be MEOB specific is at the pragmatic level. Here the organisation would seek to 
meet the direct needs and interests of specific stakeholders involved in making the judgement: in a 
PLC, this would be addressing shareholders’ needs, in mutual organisations, this would be a focus on 
members’ personal expectations. Normative legitimacy goes beyond only fulfilling the need of the 
one key-stakeholder/owner and extends the matter to other stakeholders who set expectations as 
to the kind of behaviour they expect of the MEOB with other stakeholder groups, as, for example, 
set out in the normative principles at the base of the framework.  
Cognitive legitimacy links to the worldview of key stakeholders; i.e. how do they understand the 
world around them? An organization accrues cognitive legitimacy with stakeholders if it is 
inconceivable that their worldview would be complete without it being present: for example, Oxfam 
may be considered to be legitimised cognitively because it is part of the social fabric of the 
development sector in the UK. Within MEOBs, it may be smaller, specialist organisations that meet 
this level of legitimacy, for example Unicorn Groceries (a grocery store specialising in vegan food 
with its own food growing business) or Ecology Building Society (only extending mortgages to 
environmentally friendly builds or social housing); however, looking at the perception of society at 
large, MEOBs such as John Lewis may also be considered to be cognitively legitimised because of 
their distinctiveness within the UK economy and their longevity. However, relatively few 
organisations manage to achieve this state of legitimacy. 
Outcomes and stakeholder value 
This paper suggests that a well-performing MEOB generates outcomes that combined could be 
considered to be of value to key stakeholders. Again, whilst some criteria are more relevant in 
certain types of organisations, for example employee fairness should be a strong feature of 
employee-owned businesses, it should not be excluded from the mutual and cooperative context, 
because employees are a key stakeholder and should be treated fairly and with respect.  
Customer experience of fulfilled needs. Whilst customer satisfaction is a goal of many organisations, 
MEOBs should assess services offered not only in terms of their economic performance (i.e. do they 
generate a profit) but also in terms of the wider impact on society. For example, the decision of the 
Co-operative Bank to no longer offer accounts to people undergoing personal bankruptcy was 
guided by consideration of financial impact on the group results overriding the significant negative 
impact this has on the financially excluded. Fulfilling customer needs should be a long-term objective 
of the firm, and hence feature strongly in performance discussions. 
Member trust. Of obvious importance to MEOBs, member trust is an indicator of the democratic 
performance often linked to elections at AGMs. Many building societies pride themselves on high 
approval rates on voting matters, yet this may be linked to voting processes rather than actual 
approval. Likewise, high approval rates in member trust may draw an overly positive picture when 
compared to PLC businesses. For example, Ecology Building Society seeks to have as many members 
present at AGMs as possible by linking it to a social event where interested members are 
encouraged to exchange ideas and experiences. This leads to higher than average member physical  
 19 
 
presence and voting turnout4 than, for example, at Nationwide, which has a large number of 
members who may identify less with the organisation; and with the added complexity of Nationwide 
being a large business, members may find it more difficult to understand the business developments. 
Employee Fairness. Procedural and distributive fairness are vital elements of organisational justice 
and establishing a just culture. Chi and Han (2008) define distributive justice as ‘the perceived 
fairness of the organizational allocation of resources’ (Folger and Cropanzano 1998; Witt et al. 2001), 
and procedural justice as ‘the perceived fairness of the procedure used to make decisions’ (Folger 
and Cropanzano 1998; Korsgaard et al. 1995), where ‘employees perceive aspects related to 
procedural justice when they experience opportunities to influence decisions, to express their voices, 
or to possess accurate information used for making decisions’ (Price et al. 2006; Thibaut and Walker 
1975). Tyler and Blader (2003) argue that procedural fairness is more important to people than 
distributive justice because it is related to a sense of having been treated with respect. In distributive 
justice, people are satisfied when they perceive outcomes to have been divided fairly, even if this 
involves them giving up resources and accepting less (ibid: 350). Procedural justice has both a 
decision-making and a value-expressive function. The ‘value-expressive worth’ of procedural justice 
lies in the interactional dimensions of being treated with politeness and dignity by those in positions 
of authority which, in turn, stimulates commitment and cooperation (ibid, 351). This intersubjective 
dimension of procedural justice is valued by people, independent of whether they have an influence 
over decision-making. People rely upon positive inter-relations to provide the respect and esteem 
recognition (Honneth 1995) out of which they construct positive self-identities: ‘the central reason 
that people engage themselves in groups is because they use the feedback they receive from these 
groups to create and maintain their identities’ (Tyler and Blader 2003, 353).  
 
Community legitimacy. As the involvement in local communities is one key aspect of MEOBs as 
reflecting either the commonly shared interests of member-owners, or are specific to a particular 
region or locality the MEOB operates in. For example, a mutual with a mandate to enrich the 
environment would likely be funding projects that support that aim, and one based in the north of 
England would be more likely to engage with the region than fund projects in London. These types of 
interaction can vary significantly. Larger MEOBs, for example Nationwide and John Lewis might 
mostly interact through charitable donations, yet might also see their presence as something that 
benefits communities. John Lewis, for example, highlights how it seeks to support regeneration 
areas by providing local jobs and enriching the local built environment. Smaller building societies, 
credit unions and employee-owned businesses may support more local causes. Darlington Building 
Society allocates annual budgets to branches with staff making decisions as to how the money is 
best spent. As with legitimacy discussed previously one key objective is to link relevant expectations 
of organisation and communities.  
Organisational resilience. As suggested by the Communities and Local Government Committee 
(2012), MEOBs tend to be relatively resilient to changes in the wider economic climate. Yet for this 
to be the case mutual and employee-owned businesses must be well designed and, for example, 
members and employees must be committed to the organisation’s long-term success. A lack of 
member interest in the firm, or a short term outlook adopted by the organisation may be a sign that 
                                                          
4 See http://www.ecology.co.uk/about/meetings/ for further details 
 20 
 
things might go wrong. For example, a spike in profits, especially when linked to the sale of long-
term assets could illustrate that key stakeholder interests are no longer aligned with the way the 
MEOB conducts its business. 
Concluding remarks 
The evaluative framework for measuring MEOB performance aims to encourage researchers to 
examine the relationships between the different components of the model. Such research into the 
relationship between the components of this framework has been limited to date. Whilst work has 
been done on linking, for example, financial performance and mutual ownership, or employee 
participation in decision-making and impact on job satisfaction, less obvious potential relationships 
such as the link between social value and member-participation in decision-making, or between 
social performance indicators and leadership styles, have not been much researched. The 
framework presented in this paper allows for a multitude of possible combinations between a series 
of performance indicators. This may underline why MEOB performance differs not only across, but 
also within the different types of business forms, with for example some financial mutuals producing 
strong financial outputs whilst others perform worse financially yet have stronger social 
performance indicators.  
In particular, the framework seeks to draw attention to the relationship between inputs and outputs 
of a firm which has not featured in other holistic conceptualisations, such as Emerson’s Blended 
Value. In making these connections more visible, we incoporate values and principles into the 
assessment of MEOB performance, thereby illuminating which structural features of MEOBs must be 
considered when accounting for the impact created. Moreover, the hope is that the framework will 
encourage the empirical examination of the relationships between multiple components in various 
possible combinations in particular by incorporating values and principles in existing output oriented 
accounting and evaluation tools discussed by Nicholls (2009): for example, the way in which 
principles are implemented (or not) linked with member participation in governance and a reflective 
leadership style may be correlated with financial, social and culture performance measures, thus 
affecting overall stakeholder value generation. In so doing, future research could establish a series of 
best-practice scenarios that could shape not only how MEOBs are shaped and conduct their business, 
but may equally have useful implications for policy-making and reform. In particular, understanding 
the relationships between framework components could help resources to be targeted more 
efficiently. Likewise, it may encourage regulators to acknowledge, say, behavioural differences 
between MEOBs and PLCs leading to adjustments in regulatory scrutiny. This may be of particular 
relevance to the regulation of financial mutuals and building societies, who are, for regulatory 
purposes, too often treated like PLCs. 
While the aim of this paper is to present an evaluative framework for mutual and employee-owned 
business, there are certain limitations worth considering. First, whilst aiming to include the key 
aspects for evaluating mutual and employee-owned business, some information may be incomplete. 
In this respect, the framework should be understood as indicating the kind of factors that may be 
worthwhile considering when evaluating mutual performance. Second, the components depicted in 
the framework are arranged in such a way that it allows readers to follow a logical flow. Nonetheless, 
by no means does this infer causal mechanisms; indeed, individual aspects discussed are likely to 
have repercussions for the understanding of MEOB performance elsewhere. For example, a poorly 
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integrated voice system may have a negative influence on legitimacy, but may also require the 
questioning of the values and principles that the organisation is supposed to follow. Thus, the 
individual aspects should be understood within the context of the framework. Third, the framework 
includes both conceptual and empirical aspects. However, the inclusion of both aspects was 
considered crucial in enabling the conceptualisation of MEOBs in a holistic way. Fourth, the 
framework is predominantly informed by the British context. However, at numerous points, 
reference has been made to international experience, for example, the Finish co-operative banking 
sector OP or employee-ownership in the US, and highlighting the potential for the framework to be 
usefully developed for different national regulatory environments.  
Overall, the evaluative framework proposed in this paper should be regarded as a step towards 
developing a more inclusive performance measurement framework to take into account non-
financial performance indicators. Indeed, whilst some MEOBs are already moving towards the 
inclusion of non-financial indicators including membership involvement, and the social and 
environmental impact of their operations, the link to the organisation’s values and principles is too 
often left unexplored. As a result, external agents may ignore such measures when assessing 
performance in MEOBs, as these may appear to be of marginal importance compared to financial 
indicators. To challenge this idea, it is crucial that MEOBs ensure that their values and principles of 
operations are clearly reflected in their own performance evaluations at centre-stage. Thus, instead 
of beginning the discussion of performance with a review of financial figures, MEOBs should begin 
the discussion of results by stating their aims and objectives, and then seek to show clearly if, how 
and to what extent they managed to achieve these wider sets of objectives. It is in this sense that 
the proposed framework set out here should be seen as a guide to creating an appropriately holistic 
approach to evaluating the performance of mutual and employee-owned businesses. 
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